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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a method of enciphering quantum states of two-state
systems (qubits) for sending them in secrecy without entangled qubits shared by
two legitimate users (Alice and Bob). This method has the following two properties.
First, even if an eavesdropper (Eve) steals qubits, she can extract information from
them with certain probability at most. Second, Alice and Bob can confirm that the
qubits are transmitted between them correctly by measuring a signature. If Eve
measures m qubits one by one from n enciphered qubits and sends alternative ones
(the Intercept/Resend attack), a probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve’s
action is equal to (3/4)m or less. Passwords for decryption and the signature are
given by classical binary strings and they are disclosed through a public channel.
Enciphering classical information by this method is equivalent to the one-time pad
method with distributing a classical key (random binary string) by the BB84 proto-
col. If Eve takes away qubits, Alice and Bob lose the original quantum information.
If we apply our method to a state in iteration, Eve’s success probability decreases
exponentially. We cannot examine security against the case that Eve makes an
attack with using entanglement. This remains to be solved in the future.
1 Introduction
Since considerable progress was made in quantum information and computation theory,
many researchers have been studying to realize the information processing that we have
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never had by using quantum mechanics[16]. At the same time, it has been studying
to apply the uncertainty principle, the quantum no-cloning theorem, and entanglement
between quantum systems to cryptography[8]. The BB84 protocol is considered to be
an effective method for the key distribution. By combining it with the one-time pad
method, we obtain a highly secure cryptography[1][2][5]. On the other hand, the quantum
teleportation is considered to be an excellent method for sending arbitrary quantum states
between two parties[6][7].
The BB84 protocol is used for a secure distribution of a classical key (binary string)
to two legitimate users (Alice and Bob). Choosing a basis vector at random from four
basis vectors, the rectilinear basis {|0〉, |1〉} and the circular basis {(1/√2)(|0〉 ± |1〉)}, as
a state of a photon (a two-state system or a qubit), Alice sends it to Bob. Bob measures
a transmitted photon in an orthonormal basis that he chooses from two bases (rectilinear
and circular) at random and independently of Alice.
Not being consistent with each other, the rectilinear basis and the circular basis are
called conjugate bases. A result of measurement with a wrong basis is random. If an
eavesdropper (Eve) steals a photon from the channel, measures it in a basis chosen at
random, and sends an alternative one, Alice and Bob find inconsistency with probability
of 1/4 or more and notice Eve’s eavesdropping. In this way, by using the uncertainty
principle, the BB84 protocol reveals Eve’s illegal act.
A. K. Ekert proposed another protocol for distributing a classical key by transmitting
pairs of qubits in EPR states, |Ψ−〉 = (1/√2)(|01〉 − |10〉), apart to Alice and Bob from
a source[3]. They detect Eve by Bell’s theorem. Considering a simplified protocol of
A. K. Ekert’s, C. H. Bennett et al. showed it was equivalent to BB84[4]. From these
successive works, it has been recognized that we do not need to use the entanglement
for distributing a classical key by quantum mechanics. (But, by combining entangle-
ment purification protocol with Ekert’s protocol, we can distribute a classical key in high
secrecy[9].)
The quantum teleportation is used for transmitting an arbitrary state from Alice
to Bob. They share an EPR-pair of qubits beforehand. Alice carries out the Bell-
measurement on both a one-qubit state |ψ〉 that she wants to send and her qubit of
the EPR-pair. Receiving a result of her measurement, Bob can construct |ψ〉 from his
qubit of the EPR-pair. A characteristic of this method is that classical information and
non-classical information of |ψ〉 are divided perfectly and only the classical information
is sent through the public channel. If they share the EPR-pair correctly, Eve can neither
eavesdrop on the state nor destroy it in principle.
These methods are related to the quantum no-cloning theorem. It tells us there is no
unitary transformation that makes accurate clones of arbitrary quantum states[8]. In the
BB84 protocol, it gives an effect as follows. Not knowing which basis is chosen for a qubit
(photon) that she extracts from the quantum channel, rectilinear or circular, Eve cannot
make a clone of the qubit and keep it. What she can do is only measuring the qubit in a
proper basis and sending an alternative one that depends on a result of the measurement
to Bob. In the quantum teleportation, the following thing is important. Because Alice
can neither measure |ψ〉 without disturbance nor make an accurate clone of it, she cannot
extract information from |ψ〉 at all. During the whole process, Alice and Bob have no
knowledge about |ψ〉.
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In the quantum teleportation, Alice and Bob have to share an EPR-pair of qubits
beforehand. After being emitted by a source, this pair flies towards them apart through
a quantum channel. Therefore, for example, if Eve takes away the qubit that Bob is
supposed to have and sends an alternative one to him, she succeeds in eavesdropping.
To avoid such a trouble, Alice and Bob need to share a lot of EPR-pairs and to purify
them[9].
In this paper, we consider a method for enciphering arbitrary quantum states for
sending them in secrecy without entangled qubits shared by Alice and Bob beforehand.
In our method, there are two points as follows. (See Figure 3.)
First, even if Eve takes away qubits, she can extract quantum information from them
with certain probability at most. (If Eve measures m qubits one by one from n enciphered
qubits and sends alternative ones, a probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve’s
act is equal to (3/4)m or less. We assume Eve makes only the Intercept/Resend attack[2].)
Alice applies a unitary operator Ui which is chosen at random from a set of operators
M = {Uj} to an arbitrary n-qubit state |Ψ〉 that she wants to send in secrecy. The
subscript i of Ui is a password for decryption. Not knowing which operator is chosen from
M, Eve regards the enciphered state as a mixed state of Uj |Ψ〉 for all Uj ∈M with equal
probability. If Alice prepares M so that the density operator of the mixed state may be
in proportion to the identity operator I, Eve cannot extract the information of |Ψ〉 at all
without the password i. The reason of this is that even if Eve puts auxiliary qubits on
the density operator ρ = (1/2n)I, applies unitary transformations to it, or measures it,
she cannot extract |Ψ〉. After confirming that the quantum state is transmitted correctly,
Alice releases the password i in our protocol. Therefore, to extract information from
|Ψ〉, Eve has to eavesdrop without disturbing Alice and Bob’s certification process. (This
technique has been also discussed by P. O. Boykin and V. Roychowdhury, and M. Mosca
et al.[17]. They have shown the following result. When we define M as a set of tensor
products of the Pauli matrices, the number of the operators {Ui} gets minimum and the
subscript i is represented by a 2n-bit string.)
Second, Alice and Bob can confirm that a quantum state received by Bob is a genuine
one sent by Alice. Not having knowledge about the n-qubit state |Ψ〉Q at all, they
do not notice Eve replace the genuine qubits with alternative ones. Therefore, they
need to confirm that the qubits Bob receives are genuine. (It seems like authentication
of the identity of a correspondent on networks.) In our method, after putting an n-
qubit state |a〉S (a ∈ {0, 1}n) that represents her signature on UQi |Ψ〉Q, Alice makes
entanglement between qubits of each pair in the system Q and S. Here, we call the
quantum system which represents the transmitted information Q and the quantum system
which represents the signature S. Then, to forbid Eve to make clones of qubits, Alice
applies an operator chosen at random from L = {I, H, σx, Hσx} to each qubit, where
H is called the Hadamard transformation and it causes |0〉 → (1/√2)(|0〉 + |1〉), |1〉 →
(1/
√
2)(|0〉 − |1〉), and σx is one of the Pauli matrices and it causes |0〉 → |1〉, |1〉 → |0〉.
Hence, quantum information of each qubit is encoded in a basis chosen at random from
two conjugate bases (rectilinear and circular). Therefore, if Eve does anything on the
qubits, Alice and Bob can find inconsistency and detect Eve with certain probability.
This is essentially the same technique used in BB84. In our method, certification of a
correspondent and detection of Eve are done at the same time. The second password for
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decryption is which operators are chosen from L.
Because the passwords and the signature represented by classical binary strings are
transmitted by the public channel, Eve also knows them. If |Ψ〉Q represents classical
information (a product state of |0〉 and |1〉), our protocol is equivalent to the one-time
pad method with classical key distribution by BB84.
If Alice and Bob apply our enciphering method to a state in iteration, a probability
that Eve gets quantum information with fidelity of 1 decreases exponentially. (If they
encipher a one-qubit state with N qubits, the probability is given by (3/4)N/2.) We can
regard it as privacy amplification process. We cannot examine security against the case
that Eve makes an attack with using entanglement. This remains to be solved in the
future.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we explain how Alice and Bob forbid
Eve to extract the original quantum information and how they confirm the qubits are
transmitted correctly. In Sec. 3, we explain the whole protocol and discuss how Bob
confirms that he receives qubits. In Sec. 4, we discuss security of our protocol against
Eve’s Intercept/Resend attack on each qubit. In Sec. 5, we discuss privacy amplification
process. In Sec. 6, we give a brief discussion.
2 Enciphering quantum states
In this section, we explain how Alice and Bob forbid Eve to extract the original quantum
information and how they confirm the qubits are transmitted correctly.
First, we consider transforming an arbitrary quantum state so that Eve cannot recover
an original quantum state. For simplicity, we consider an arbitrary one-qubit state for
a while and we describe its density operator as ρ defined on a two-dimensional Hilbert
space H2. We assume Alice wants to send ρ to Bob in secrecy. She does not know ρ at
all, because her partial measurement destroys it.
Alice prepares a set of operators,
M = {σj : j = 0, x, y, z},
where σ0 = I (the identity operator) and {σx, σy, σz} are the Pauli matrices. Taking
|0〉 =
(
1
0
)
, |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
,
for an orthonormal basis, we write them as
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
M may be disclosed in public. Choosing an operator σi fromM at random, Alice carries
out the following unitary transformation,
ρ→ σiρσ†i .
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She keeps the subscript i secret as a password and never tells it to anyone. Because the
subscript takes a value from {0, x, y, z}, the password can be represented by 2-bit classical
information.
Not knowing which transformation Alice applies to the qubit, Eve has to regard the
state as
ρ′ =
1
4
∑
j=0,x,y,z
σjρσ
†
j .
Generally, the density operator ρ satisfies ρ† = ρ, Trρ = 1, 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1, and
λ1 + λ2 = 1 where λ1, λ2 are eigenvalues of ρ. Hence, we can describe an arbitrary ρ as
ρ =
1
2
(I + a · σ),
where a = (a1, a2, a3) is a three-component real vector and 0 ≤ ∑3k=1 a2k ≤ 1. Because
ρ′ =
1
2
I +
1
8
∑
j=0,x,y,z
a · σjσσ†j , (1)
and
σjσkσj =
{
σk j = 0 or j = k
−σk j 6= k and j, k ∈ {x, y, z} ,
there is no contribution from the second term of Eq. (1). We obtain
ρ′ =
1
2
I.
Therefore, even if Eve takes away ρ′, she cannot extract information from it at all, because
she does not know the password i.
An arbitrary n-qubit density operator ρn is given by
ρn =
1
2n
(I +
∑
k∈{0,x,y,z}n,k6=(0,···,0)
akUk), (2)
where
Uk = σk1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σkn ,
and ak (k ∈ {0, x, y, z}n, k 6= (0, · · · , 0)) is real. (In Eq. (2), I represents the identity
operator for n-qubit states.) Choosing an operator Ui from
Mn = {Uk : Uk = σk1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σkn ,k ∈ {0, x, y, z}n},
at random, Alice applies it to ρn for encryption as ρn → UiρnU †i . If Eve takes away the
density operator given by
ρ′n =
1
4n
∑
j∈{0,x,y,z}n
UjρnU
†
j
=
1
2n
I +
1
4n · 2n
∑
j,k∈{0,x,y,z}n,k6=(0,···,0)
akUjUkU
†
j
=
1
2n
I, (3)
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Figure 1: The second encryption by Alice.
AA
AA
AA
AA
|0>, |1>,
2
1 (|0>    |1>)
|0>, |1>, (|0>    |1>)
2
1
|xk>Q
xk, ak    {0, 1}
Lk,1Q, Lk,2S    {I, H, σx, Hσx}
Lk,1Q
Lk,2S
|ak>S
she cannot extract information from ρ′n at all. Even if she puts auxiliary systems on
ρ′n, applies unitary transformations to it, or carries out measurements, she cannot obtain
ρn. The password of i is given by a 2n-bit string. (This technique is also discussed by
P. O. Boykin and V. Roychowdhury, and M. Mosca et al. as mentioned in Sec. 1[17].)
Next, we explain how Alice and Bob confirm that the qubits are transmitted between
them correctly. If Eve takes away ρ′n and sends an alternative state ρ˜n to Bob, he carries
out the inverse operation on the state that he receives as ρ˜n → Uiρ˜nU †i . Not having
knowledge about the original ρn at all, Alice and Bob do not notice what Bob gets is a
fake.
To avoid this trouble, they put a signature on ρn. Reading it, they can confirm that
Bob receives the state transmitted from Alice correctly. It is important that Eve cannot
change the signature. For simplicity, we describe the state as a ket vector ∀|Ψ〉Q ∈ Hn2
instead of the density operator ρn for a while. If the n-qubit state is given by a mixed
state, we can give a similar discussion. We call the system that represents the quantum
information Q and the system that represents the signature S.
Preparing an n-bit random string ∀a = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ {0, 1}n as her signature, Alice
attaches a qubit |ak〉S to the kth qubit of
UQi |Ψ〉Q =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
cx|x1〉 · · · |xn〉 ∈ Hn2 . (4)
Applying the controlled-NOT (C-NOT) gate to the kth pair as Figure 1, she obtains
|xk〉Q|ak〉S → |xk〉Q|ak ⊕ xk mod 2〉S for k = 1, · · · , n.
Choosing LQk,1, L
S
k,2 ∈ L = {I, H, σx, Hσx} at random, she applies them to the qubits of
the pair, where
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
.
Alice repeats this operation on the k = 1, · · · , nth qubit, and we write the whole transfor-
mation as V QSα . α represents which operators are chosen from L. The second password
α is given by a classical 4n-bit string.
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Figure 2: Typical quantum gates.
|i>a
i, j    {0, 1}
|j>b
|i>a
(i) controoled-NOT gate (ii) σx gate
|i>
|i    j  (mod 2)>b
|i    1  (mod 2)>
We often describe successive operations on qubits as a network like Figure 1. A
horizontal line represents a qubit and time proceeds from left to right. Figure 2 shows
examples of unitary transformations applied to qubits. Figure 2. i and ii. represent the
C-NOT gate and σx each[10].
The operations that we have discussed are summarized as follows,
|Ψ〉Q → UQi |Ψ〉Q (1st password i)
→ |a〉S ⊗ UQi |Ψ〉Q (signature a)
→ V QSα [|a〉S ⊗ UQi |Ψ〉Q] (2nd password α).
Double encryption prevents Eve from using |a〉S ill. If V QSα is not applied to the state,
Eve may take away all of the qubits, keep UQi |Ψ〉Q, and send a fake of |a〉S⊗|Ψ˜〉Q to Bob.
If Eve does anything on the kth qubit of Q, the signature of |ak〉S is destroyed and Bob
fails in the certification process with certain probability or more. This is caused by the
facts that conjugate bases chosen at random represent the systems Q and S, and there is
entanglement between Q and S. If she does anything on the kth qubit of S, we can get
a similar result. We estimate a probability that Alice and Bob notice Eve’s illegal act in
Sec. 4.
3 The protocol for secure transmission
We consider a protocol for transmitting an arbitrary quantum state ∀|Ψ〉Q ∈ Hn2 from
Alice to Bob in secrecy against Eve’s eavesdropping by using the encryption method
discussed in the previous section. Alice and Bob do not have knowledge about |Ψ〉Q at
all. Both of them can use the following two channels.
• The classical channel: It transmits classical binary strings in public. Eve can make
accurate copies of them, but she cannot alter them.
• The quantum channel: It transmits sequences of qubits (quantum information). Eve
can interact with them, but she cannot make accurate copies of them.
Alice sends qubits to Bob according to the following protocol. (See Figure 3.)
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Figure 3: Secure transmission between Alice and Bob.
Bob
AAA
AAA
AAA
A
A
AA AAA
AAA
AAA
AA
Alice
classical channel
quantum channel
|Ψcrypt>=VαQS[|a>S    UiQ|Ψ>Q]
Figure 4: Eve’s strategy for eavesdropping.
Bob
AAAA
AAAA
AAA
A
A
AAA
A
A
AA
AA
AA
A
A
AAA
Eve
Alice
quantum channel
classical channel
VαQS[|a>S    |Ψ>Q]
|Ψcrypt>
    =VαQS[|a>S    UiQ|Ψ>Q]
1. Alice sends |Ψcrypt〉 ≡ V QSα [|a〉S⊗UQi |Ψ〉Q] of 2n qubits to Bob through the quantum
channel.
2. Receiving 2n qubits, Bob breaks off the quantum channel and reports arrival of
them to Alice through the classical channel.
3. Receiving the report from Bob, Alice tells Bob what transformation V QSα is through
the classical channel. (She discloses the 4n-bit password α.)
4. Applying V QS†α to the state that he has received and measuring the signature, Bob
tells Alice a result of the measurement (an n-bit string) through the classical channel.
5. Receiving the n-bit string from Bob, Alice examines whether it coincides with the
signature a or not. If it coincides with her original signature, she tells Bob what
transformation UQi is through the classical channel. (She discloses the 2n-bit pass-
word i.) If it does not coincide, she concludes Eve has eavesdropped on qubits and
stops the protocol.
6. Bob applies UQ†i to the state that he has and obtains the original state |Ψ〉Q.
In this protocol, it is important that Bob confirms the arrival of 2n qubits (|Ψcrypt〉 or
Eve’s fake) and breaks off the quantum channel at the second step. To understand the
reason of this, we assume the following case. (See Figure 4.) Although |Ψcrypt〉 is still
halfway on the channel, Bob reports the arrival of qubits to Alice by mistake, and she
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discloses V QSα through the classical channel. Eve may take away |Ψcrypt〉, apply V QS†α to
it, and obtain |a〉S ⊗Ui|Ψ〉Q before Bob receives qubits. Eve can keep Ui|Ψ〉Q, combine a
false state |Ψ˜〉Q with |a〉S, and send V QSα [|a〉S ⊗ |Ψ˜〉Q] to Bob. If the quantum channel is
still open, Bob receives V QSα [|a〉S⊗|Ψ˜〉Q]. Because the signature is correct, Alice and Bob
cannot notice Eve’s illegal act. Alice discloses UQi in public and finally Eve gets |Ψ〉Q.
To avoid this trouble, Bob needs to verify that a batch of qubits (|Ψcrypt〉 or Eve’s
fake) has arrived. For example, it is good for Bob to take the following method.
We construct a qubit from a pair of optical paths (modes) that are represented by x
and y in Figure 5. iii[11]. We describe a state that there is no photon on a mode as |0〉
and a state that there is a photon on a mode as |1〉. Writing a state that no photon is
on the mode x and one photon is on the mode y as |0〉x ⊗ |1〉y = |01〉, we regard |01〉 as
logical |0¯〉. We regard |1〉x|0〉y as logical |1¯〉 similarly. Hence, we can write an arbitrary
state of a qubit as
|ψ〉 = α|01〉+ β|10〉 = α|0¯〉+ β|1¯〉 for |α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
We assume Eve puts a 50-50 beamsplitter halfway on the quantum channel to take
away photons. A state of a photon is a superposition of a state that it is on the side of
Bob and a state that it is on the side of Eve with amplitude 1/
√
2 each,
1√
2
|photon on the side of Bob〉+ 1√
2
|photon on the side of Eve〉.
To examine whether the qubit of |ψ〉 has come on his own side or not, Bob prepares
another auxiliary photon and applies nonlinear interaction between the logical photon
on the mode x or y and the auxiliary one. On an optical system of Figure 5. iii, if the
photon counter Da detects the auxiliary photon, the logical photon is projected into the
state that it is on the side of Bob. On the other hand, Db’s detection projects the logical
photon into the state that it is on the side of Eve.
In Figure 5. iii, there are beamsplitters B which apply SU(2) transformations to logical
kets {|0¯〉, |1¯〉} as Figure 5. i, and Kerr-type devices K which induce nonlinear interactions
between two incoming photons as Figure 5. ii. The device K shifts a phase of a wave
function by π only if a pair of photons comes into it. (Q. A. Turchette et al. succeeds in
shifting the phase by ∆ ∼ 16◦[12].)
To clarify the operation of Figure 5. iii, we describe it by a network of quantum gates
in Figure 6[13]. Assuming the first and the second qubits are in an arbitrary entangled
state |Ψ〉Q, we examine whether the first qubit exists or not by measuring an auxiliary
qubit system A. When we write the whole system as
|Ψ〉Q|0〉A =
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
cij |i〉2|j〉1|0〉A,
|Ψ〉Q|0〉A is transformed as follows in Figure 6,
|Ψ〉Q|0〉A =
∑
i
(ci0|i〉2|0〉1 + ci1|i〉2|1〉1)|0〉A
step 1−−−→ ∑
i
(ci0|i〉2|1〉1|0〉A + ci1|i〉2|0〉1|1〉A)
9
Figure 5: The photon counting measurement with nonlinear optical devices.
mode b
mode a
mode a
mode b
input output
(i)
(ii)
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
K
mode x mode x
input output
B1 B2
a
a
b
a
b
1 2
1 2
Da
Db
Alice
|ψ>
Bob
Eve
(iii)
B : |1>a|0>b               (|1>a|0>b−|0>a|1>b)
2
1
|0>a|1>b               (|1>a|0>b+|0>a|1>b)2
1
B
x
y
y
x
x
y
K1 K2
Kerr-type quantum phase-gate
mode a mode a
K : |1>x|0>a |1>x|0>a
|0>x|1>a |0>x|1>a
|1>x|1>a −|1>x|1>a
50-50 beamsplitter
Figure 6: A quantum network for photon counting.
|Ψ>
|0>
2nd-qubit
1st-qubit
auxiliary
qubit
step 1 step 2
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Figure 7: Eve’s Intercept/Resend attack on the system S.
AA
AA
AA
AA
U V
|0>
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
Alice Bob
Eve
L1
L2
L1+
L2+
t=0 t=τ
|a>S
a    {0, 1}L1, L2    {I, H, σx, Hσx},
|ψ>Q
step 2−−−→ ∑
i
(ci0|i〉2|0〉1 + ci1|i〉2|1〉1)|1〉A
= |Ψ〉Q|1〉A.
Therefore, measuring an auxiliary system as shown in Figures 5 and 6 for each channel,
Bob can examine whether all of the qubits are arrived or not.
4 Security against eavesdropping
It is difficult to consider all strategies Eve may take. In this section, we assume Eve
to make only the Intercept/Resend attack. Eve measures each transmitted qubit with a
proper basis independently and sends an alternative one according to the result of the
measurement[2]. We pay attention to the following fact. Eve cannot extract information
about |Ψ〉Q at all without getting the first password i of UQi |Ψ〉Q, because the enciphered
density operator is in proportion to I for her. Therefore, Eve needs to keep her illegal
action secret from Alice and Bob during their authentication process so that Alice may
disclose the first password i. In this section, we estimate a probability that Alice and Bob
fail to notice Eve’s illegal act.
For simplicity, we assume that |Ψ〉Q is an arbitrary n-qubit product state for a while.
At the first encryption, Alice applies ∀UQi = σi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σin to |Ψ〉Q = |ψ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψn〉.
Hence, UQi |Ψ〉Q is also a product state and we may treat each qubit independently.
We write the kth qubit (∀k ∈ {1, · · · , n}) of UQi |Ψ〉Q as |ψ〉Q = α|0〉Q + β|1〉Q and
the kth qubit of the signature as |a〉S (a ∈ {0, 1}). A state that Alice sends at t = 0 in
Figure 7 is given by
αL1|0〉QL2|a〉S + βL1|1〉QL2|a⊕ 1〉S.
Bob measures only the system S at t = τ . If he gets |a〉S, Alice and Bob consider the state
is transmitted correctly. Bob uses the following projection operator for the measurement,
ΠQSL1,L2 = (L1|0〉〈0|L†1)Q ⊗ (L2|a〉〈a|L†2)S + (L1|1〉〈1|L†1)Q ⊗ (L2|a⊕ 1〉〈a⊕ 1|L†2)S.
11
Figure 8: Eve’s Intercept/Resend attack on one qubit.
|0>E
U V
L2    {I, H, σx, Hσx}
|φ>S |φ>S=L2|0>S
Here, we assume Eve makes an attack only on the qubit of the system S as Figure 7
(U and V are arbitrary unitary transformations applied to one qubit). We write the
dynamical process of S as a completely positive linear map $ that represents Eve’s Inter-
cept/Resend attack on S[14]. Hence, the density operator ρS at t = 0 evolves to $(ρS) at
t = τ . We can write the state of QS at t = τ as
ρQSL1,L2(τ) = |α|2(L1|0〉〈0|L†1)Q ⊗ $(L2|a〉〈a|L†2)S
+αβ∗(L1|0〉〈1|L†1)Q ⊗ $(L2|a〉〈a⊕ 1|L†2)S
+βα∗(L1|1〉〈0|L†1)Q ⊗ $(L2|a⊕ 1〉〈a|L†2)S
+|β|2(L1|1〉〈1|L†1)Q ⊗ $(L2|a⊕ 1〉〈a⊕ 1|L†2)S.
We can write the probability P that Bob obtains |a〉S as
P = TrQS[ρ
QS
L1,L2(τ)Π
QS
L1,L2 ]
= |α|2〈a|L†2$(L2|a〉〈a|L†2)L2|a〉+ |β|2〈a⊕ 1|L†2$(L2|a⊕ 1〉〈a⊕ 1|L†2)L2|a⊕ 1〉. (5)
Seeing this, we find the following fact. Although the initial state |ψ〉Q of the system Q
is a superposition of |0〉 and |1〉, we may regard the state as a mixed state of |ψ〉Q = |0〉
and |ψ〉Q = |1〉 with classical probability for evaluating P .
Therefore, the probability of Bob’s authentication is equal to an average of proba-
bilities that a network of quantum gates in Figure 8 gives |φ〉S as an outcome from an
incoming state |φ〉S = L2|0〉S for all of L2 ∈ L. Here, we evaluate P as follows. U and V
are arbitrary unitary transformations applied to one qubit. We assume U is defined as
U |ϕ0〉 = |0〉, U |ϕ1〉 = |1〉,
where {|ϕ0〉, |ϕ1〉} is a certain orthonormal basis of H2. Then, we write |φ〉 = c0|ϕ0〉 +
c1|ϕ1〉. The state is transformed on the network of Figure 8 as
|φ〉S|0〉E = (c0|ϕ0〉S + c1|ϕ1〉S)|0〉E
U−−−→ (c0|0〉S + c1|1〉S)|0〉E
C-NOT−−−→ c0|0〉S|0〉E + c1|1〉S|1〉E
V−−−→ c0V |0〉S|0〉E + c1V |1〉S|1〉E. (6)
Seeing Eq. (6), we find that Eve measures the enciphered qubit in the basis {|ϕ0〉, |ϕ1〉}
and sends a ket vector of a basis {V |0〉, V |1〉} according to a result of measurement.
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Hence, we can write the probability Pφ that Bob gets the correct signature for |φ〉S in
spite of Eve’s illegal act as
Pφ = |c0|2|〈φ|V |0〉|2 + |c1|2|〈φ|V |1〉|2. (7)
From now on, for simplicity, we write equations with density operators. Defining
ρφ = |φ〉〈φ|, ρ˜0 = |ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|, ρ˜1 = |ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|, ρ˜′0 = V |0〉〈0|V †, ρ˜′1 = V |1〉〈1|V †,
we can write Eq. (6) as
ρφ → $(ρφ) = (Trρφρ˜0)ρ˜′0 + (Trρφρ˜1)ρ˜′1,
and Eq. (7) as
Pφ = Tr[$(ρφ)ρφ].
Four density operators L2|0〉〈0|L†2 (L2 ∈ L), emitted as |φ〉S with equal probability,
are described as
ρl =
1
2
(I + σz), ρ↔ =
1
2
(I − σz), ρ⊂⊲ =
1
2
(I + σx), ρ⊃⊳ =
1
2
(I − σx).
Then we define
ρ˜i =
1
2
[I + (−1)iX · σ], ρ˜′j =
1
2
[I + (−1)jX ′ · σ] for i, j ∈ {0, 1},
where X = (X, Y, Z) and X ′ = (X ′, Y ′, Z ′) are arbitrary three-component real vectors
with |X|2 = |X ′|2 = 1. Using the following formula,
Tr(I +A · σ)(I +B · σ) = 2(1 +A ·B),
and averaging four kinds of Pφ, we estimate PB that Bob measures the correct signature
in spite of Eve’s illegal act at
PB =
1
4
(Pl + P↔ + P⊂⊲ + P⊃⊳ ) =
1
4
(2 +XX ′ + ZZ ′) ≤ 3
4
. (8)
Therefore, the probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve make an attack by
the network of Figure 8 is 3/4 or less. If Eve makes the Intercept/Resend attack on the
system Q, we can give a similar discussion. Consequently, the probability that Alice and
Bob do not notice Eve’s attacks on m qubits (either Q or S in each pair) is (3/4)m at
most.
Next, we consider the case that Eve makes the Intercept/Resend attack on both qubits
of a pair QS independently in Figure 9 (U1, U2, V1, and V2 are arbitrary unitary transfor-
mations). Measuring ρQS transmitted from Alice, Eve sends the following density operator
ρQS
′
to Bob,
ρQS
′
= $(ρQS) =
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
Tr(ρQS ρ˜Q,iρ˜S,j)ρ˜
′
Q,iρ˜
′
S,j,
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Figure 9: Eve’s Intercept/Resend attack on the system Q and S.
U2 V2
|0>
Eve
U1 V1
|0>
S
Q
where
ρ˜Q,i = U
†
1 |i〉〈i|U1 = (1/2)[I + (−1)iX1 · σ],
ρ˜S,j = U
†
2 |j〉〈j|U2 = (1/2)[I + (−1)jX2 · σ],
ρ˜′Q,i = V1|i〉〈i|V †1 = (1/2)[I + (−1)iX3 · σ],
ρ˜′S,j = V2|j〉〈j|V †2 = (1/2)[I + (−1)jX4 · σ],
(9)
and |Xk|2 = 1 (k = 1, · · · , 4).
Here, we can assume |a〉S to be |0〉S without losing generality. We write a transmitted
state of Q as |ψ〉Q = α|0〉 + β|1〉. Because Alice has sixteen kinds of ways to send the
state for L1, L2 ∈ L, Bob’s final probability for authentication is described as
PB =
1
16
∑
L1,L2∈L
Tr[$(ρQSL1,L2)Π
QS
L1,L2]. (10)
Writing the density operator of the state αL1|0〉QL2|0〉S+βL1|1〉QL2|1〉S that Alice sends
to Bob as ρQSL1,L2 , we can describe its explicit form as
ρQSL1,L2 = |α|2(L1|0〉〈0|L†1)Q ⊗ (L2|0〉〈0|L†2)S
+αβ∗(L1|0〉〈1|L†1)Q ⊗ (L2|0〉〈1|L†2)S + βα∗(L1|1〉〈0|L†1)Q ⊗ (L2|1〉〈0|L†2)S
+|β|2(L1|1〉〈1|L†1)Q ⊗ (L2|1〉〈1|L†2)S. (11)
The projection operator for Bob is given by
ΠQSL1,L2 = (L1|0〉〈0|L†1)Q ⊗ (L2|0〉〈0|L†2)S + (L1|1〉〈1|L†1)Q ⊗ (L2|1〉〈1|L†2)S.
Eq. (10) is linear for ρQSL1,L2. Therefore, we can divide Eq. (11) into terms for calculation.
First, we think about the first and forth terms of Eq. (11). We write the first term as
̺QSL1,L2 = (L1|0〉〈0|L†1)Q ⊗ (L2|0〉〈0|L†2)S. (12)
For example, if L1 = L2 = I, we obtain
̺QSI,I = (1/4)(I + σz)Q ⊗ (I + σz)S,
ΠQSI,I = (1/4)[(I + σz)Q ⊗ (I + σz)S + (I − σz)Q ⊗ (I − σz)S],
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and
Tr[$(̺QSI,I)Π
QS
I,I ] = (1/2)(1 + Z1Z2Z3Z4).
From similar calculations, we get
Tr[$(̺QSL1,L2)Π
QS
L1,L2
] =


(1/2)(1 + Z1Z2Z3Z4) for L1, L2 ∈ {I, σx},
(1/2)(1 +X1X2X3X4) for L1, L2 ∈ {H,Hσx},
(1/2)(1 + Z1X2Z3X4) for L1 ∈ {I, σx}, L2 ∈ {H,Hσx},
(1/2)(1 +X1Z2X3Z4) for L1 ∈ {H,Hσx}, L2 ∈ {I, σx}.
Therefore, we obtain
1
16
∑
L1,L2
Tr[$(̺QSL1,L2)Π
QS
L1,L2] =
1
2
+
1
8
(X1X3 + Z1Z3)(X2X4 + Z2Z4).
Next, we think about the second and third terms of Eq. (11). We write the second
term as
∆̺QSL1,L2 = (L1|0〉〈1|L†1)Q ⊗ (L2|0〉〈1|L†2)S.
For example, if L1 = L2 = I, we obtain
∆̺QSI,I = (1/4)(σx + iσy)Q ⊗ (σx + iσy)S,
Tr[$(∆̺QSI,I)Π
QS
I,I] = (1/2)(X1 + iY1)(X2 + iY2)Z3Z4.
From similar calculations, we get
Tr[$(∆̺QSL1,L2)Π
QS
L1,L2]
ǫ = 1 ǫ = −1
=


(1/2)[X1 + iǫY1][X2 + iǫY2]Z3Z4
−(1/2)[X1 + iǫY1][X2 − iǫY2]Z3Z4
(1/2)[Z1 − iǫY1][Z2 − iǫY2]X3X4
−(1/2)[Z1 − iǫY1][Z2 + iǫY2]X3X4
(1/2)[X1 + iǫY1][Z2 − iǫY2]Z3X4
−(1/2)[X1 + iǫY1][Z2 + iǫY2]Z3X4
(1/2)[Z1 − iǫY1][X2 + iǫY2]X3Z4
−(1/2)[Z1 − iǫY1][X2 − iǫY2]X3Z4
(L1, L2) = (I, I),
(I, σx),
(H,H),
(H,Hσx),
(I, H),
(I, Hσx),
(H, I),
(H, σx),
(σx, σx),
(σx, I),
(Hσx, Hσx),
(Hσx, H),
(σx, Hσx),
(σx, H),
(Hσx, σx),
(Hσx, I).
Consequently, we obtain
1
16
∑
L1,L2
Tr[$(∆̺QSL1,L2)Π
QS
L1,L2
] = −1
8
Y1Y2(Z3 −X3)(Z4 −X4).
Finally, obtaining
PB =
1
2
+
1
8
(X1X3+Z1Z3)(X2X4+Z2Z4)− 1
8
(αβ∗+α∗β)Y1Y2(Z3−X3)(Z4−X4), (13)
we can show PB ≤ 3/4. (See Appendix A.) Therefore, if |Ψ〉Q is an n-qubit product state
and if Eve makes the Intercept/Resend attack on both qubits of a pair QS independently
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as Figure 9, the probability that Eve’s illegal acts cannot be found is equal to 3/4 or less
per one qubit.
Especially, if the transmitted information is classical, |Ψ〉Q is a product state of |0〉
and |1〉. All of the 2n qubits transmitted are in states chosen from four ket vectors of two
conjugate bases at random. If we regard a as a key of an n-bit random string and |Ψ〉Q
as an n-bit enciphered classical message, our method is equivalent to the one-time pad
method with BB84. Assuming Eve makes attacks on m pairs of qubits in QS, we can
estimate the probability of Eve’s success in eavesdropping at (3/4)m or less.
Then, we consider the case that |Ψ〉Q is an arbitrary entangled state of n qubits. The
enciphered state of |Ψ〉Q with UQi is also entangled and it is given by Eq. (4).
First, we consider that Eve makes the Intercept/Resend attack on either one in a pair
of qubits of the system Q and S as Figure 7. If Eve makes this attack on m pairs out
of n pairs of the system QS, we can regard the transmission as sending an ensemble of
product states, where each qubit is |0〉 or |1〉, with classical probabilities, like Eq. (5).
We can think in a similar way before and conclude that the probability Eve’s illegal act
cannot be found is (3/4)m or less.
Next, we consider the case that Eve makes the attack on both qubits of a pair on the
entangled system QS as Figure 9. If Eve makes this attack on m pairs out of n pairs, we
can write the probability Eve is not found as an equation which is similar to Eq. (13) and
it is estimated at (3/4)m or less. (See Appendix B.)
5 Privacy amplification process
From previous discussion, we obtain the following results. If an arbitrary quantum state
is enciphered by our method, a probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve is at
most 3/4 per one qubit. (Both product and entangled states are available. We assume
that Eve always makes eavesdropping with the Intercept/Resend attack.) Hence, if Eve
makes attacks on m enciphered pairs, her success probability is given by (3/4)m and it
decreases exponentially against m.
However, there is a problem. In our method, if Eve replaces a pair of enciphered
qubits with a pair of random ones, Alice and Bob do not notice her illegal act with
probability of 1/2. In this case, they disclose passwords and Eve obtains one qubit of
original information with fidelity 1. It is important that Eve gets a correct qubit and she
knows that she obtains the correct one.
Such a problem can be also occurred in the BB84. It is possible that Alice and Bob
share the same random binary string and Eve knows a few bits of it exactly. To overcome
this trouble, for example, Alice and Bob can choose some bits at random from the shared
binary string and make a new bit from a summation of them with modulo 2[2]. If they
repeat this process and create a new binary string that is shorter than original one, Eve’s
expected information decreases to 0 in some asymptotic limit. Such a technique is called
privacy amplification.
On the other hand, in our protocol, Eve’s success probability for eavesdropping on
one-qubit cannot always reach 0. To decrease it to 0 asymptotically, Alice and Bob apply
our protocol over and over again. To make discussion simple, we consider encryption of
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one-qubit quantum information for a while.
Preparing an arbitrary one-qubit state |ψ1〉 and a one-qubit signature |a1〉 (∀a1 ∈
{0, 1}), Alice applies our protocol to |ψ1〉|a1〉 and generates an entangled two-qubit state
|ψ2〉. Then, she prepares other qubits |a2〉|a3〉 for a signature, and enciphers |ψ2〉|a2〉|a3〉
again. She obtains a four-qubit state |ψ3〉.
If Eve wants to get quantum information of |ψ1〉 with fidelity 1, she has to interact
with all four qubits of |ψ3〉. For example, if Eve replaces |ψ3〉 with random four qubits,
Alice and Bob notice her illegal act with probability of (1/2)3 = 1/8, because they carry
out the authentication process with |a1〉, |a2〉, and |a3〉.
If Alice enciphers |ψ1〉 for n times, the nth encryption needs 2n−1 signature qubits. If
Eve makes attacks on all enciphered qubits of |ψn+1〉, the probability that Alice and Bob
do not notice her act is (3/4)N/2 at most, where N = 2n is the number of all enciphered
qubits. (The probability 3/4 comes from the fact that Alice enciphers the state with
rectilinear and circular bases at random, and it does not depend on |ψn〉.) Hence, Eve’s
success probability that she gets |ψ1〉 with fidelity of 1 decreases exponentially against
the number of qubits, and reaches 0 in the limit of N →∞.
Another method is as follows. Alice and Bob share a random binary string beforehand
as the first password (subscripts of Pauli matrices) in secrecy by BB84. Because they do
not need to disclose it, Eve can never get information of |ψ1〉 at all even in the case that
they do not notice Eve’s disturbance. In this method, the privacy amplification has to be
done for BB84 actually.
6 Discussion
To understand our method more clearly, we consider a simple one and compare it with
ours. For transmitting an n-qubit quantum state in secrecy, we can take the following
method. Enciphering an n-qubit state ρn as Eq. (3), Alice prepares other n qubits as
check ones that are given as {|0〉, |1〉} or {(1/√2)(|0〉 ± |1〉)} at random respectively.
Then, Alice permutes all of the 2n qubits at random and sends them to Bob.
Here, we assume Eve tries to eavesdrop on only one qubit of ρn. Because Eve does not
know which qubits are check ones, a probability that Alice and Bob fail to notice Eve’s
illegal act can be (1/2)[1+ (3/4)] = 7/8 as the maximum, in spite of 3/4 for our method.
This is because we use entanglement in our method.
Even if Eve prepares an arbitrary one-qubit state by herself in spite of taking away
a qubit from ρn, its expectation value of fidelity is equal to 1/2. This shows that Eve’s
success probability of eavesdropping is always equal to 1/2 or more. In our method, if
Eve interacts enciphered qubits, a probability of her success is equal to at most 3/4 per
one qubit (without privacy amplification). It is similar to the BB84.
In this paper, the security against Eve’s attack with using entanglement is not con-
sidered (for example, a case that she uses a quantum computer for eavesdropping as
Figure 10). In Figure 10, it is difficult to evaluate the upper bound of the probability
that Bob measures the signature correctly for arbitrary unitary transformations U1, U2,
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Figure 10: Eve’s attack on the system QS by using entanglement.
U2 V2
|0>
Eve
U1 V1
S
Q
|0>
|0>
Eve
Q
S
U1
U2
V1
V2
(i) (ii)
V1, and V2. For instance, assuming
U1 = U2 = V1 = V2 = U where U =
(
cos(π/8) sin(π/8)
sin(π/8) − cos(π/8)
)
,
and |Ψ〉Q represents classical information (an n-qubit product state of |0〉 and |1〉), we
get PB = (13/16) > (3/4) for Figure 10. i and PB = (11/16) < (3/4) for Figure 10. ii.
Eavesdropping with U is equivalent to measuring and resending a qubit in the following
basis,
|ϕi〉〈ϕi| = 1
2
(I + (−1)iX · σ), X = ( 1√
2
, 0,
1√
2
),
which is called the Breidbart basis[2]. About Figure 10. i, PB may exceed 3/4. But, the
amount of information Eve can extract in Figure 10. i seems to be less than the amount
of information she obtains by the Intercept/Resend attack on one qubit as Figure 7.
In our method, if Eve takes away qubits, Alice and Bob lose original information of
them.
We mentioned in Sec. 1 that the classical key distribution can be done only by the
uncertainty, and the entanglement is not essential for it[3][4]. On the other hand, for
transmitting quantum states by the quantum teleportation, the entanglement plays an
essential role[6]. Our method uses both two properties.
Recently, the method for transmitting classical binary data (not a classical random
string) in secrecy with a pair of entangled photons has been proposed[15]. It is charac-
terized by the following facts. First, Alice and Bob prepare two conjugate bases on H22
each for encoding message and measuring photons. Second, they use a two-dimensional
subspace of H22 for encoding a binary digit.
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A The maximum value of PB for a product state |Ψ〉Q
Here, we show that PB defined in Eq. (13) never exceeds 3/4.
Because of |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, we get −1 ≤ αβ∗ + α∗β ≤ 1. Hence, altering the signs of
Xi as Xi → −Xi (i = 1, · · · , 4), we can write the upper bound of PB as
PB ≤ 1
2
+
1
8
fMAX ,
where fMAX is the maximum value of
f = (X1X3 + Z1Z3)(X2X4 + Z2Z4) + Y1Y2(X3 + Z3)(X4 + Z4), (14)
with |X i|2 = 1 and Xi, Yi, Zi ≥ 0 for i = 1, · · · , 4.
Seeing Eq. (14), we give another form of f as follows,
f = |A ·B|,
where
A = (X1X3 + Z1Z3, Y1(X3 + Z3)),
B = (X2X4 + Z2Z4, Y2(X4 + Z4)).
(We pay an attention that A and B are two-component real vectors.) From the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, we get
f ≤ |A||B|.
Therefore, by estimating the maximum values of |A| and |B|, we derive the upper bound
of f .
We can write |A|2 in the following form,
|A|2 = (1− Z21 )X23 + (1−X21 )Z23 + 2(X1Z3)(Z1X3) + 2Y 21 (X3Z3).
On the other hand, from the arithmetic-geometric inequality, we obtain
(X1Z3)(Z1X3) ≤ 1
2
[(X1Z3)
2 + (Z1X3)
2],
X3Z3 ≤ 1
2
(X23 + Z
2
3).
Therefore, we get
|A|2 ≤ (1 + Y 21 )(X23 + Z23) ≤ 1 + Y 21 ≤ 2. (15)
We obtain |A| ≤ √2. In a similar way, we obtain |B| ≤ √2. From these results, we can
conclude that f ≤ 2 and fMAX = 2.
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B The maximum value of PB for an entangled state
|Ψ〉Q
We estimate the probability that Eve’s illegal act cannot be found in the case where she
makes the Intercept/Resend attack onm pairs of qubits on the system QS for an arbitrary
entangled |Ψ〉Q of n qubits.
For simplicity, we assume |Ψ〉Q to be an arbitrary entangled state of two-qubit system
qq′ at first,
|Ψ〉Q =
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
cij|i〉q ⊗ |j〉q′ ∈ ∀H22.
Alice puts two qubits of the system S(= ss′) for the signature on the qubits of the system
Q(= qq′) respectively. Then, she makes entanglement between the systems Q and S with
C-NOT gates, applies L1, L2, L
′
1, L
′
2 ∈ L to four qubits q, s, q′, s′ respectively, and sends
them to Bob (see Figure 7). Eve makes the Intercept/Resend attacks on the systems q,
s, q′, s′ respectively as shown in Figure 9. We can assume the initial states of qubits s, s′
that represents the signature to be |0〉s|0〉s′ without losing generality.
Writing the state sent by Alice as
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
cijL1|i〉qL2|i〉s ⊗ L′1|j〉q′L′2|j〉s′,
we can describe the density operator explicitly as
ρQSL1L2L′1L′2
= (L1L2L
′
1L
′
2)
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
[|cij|2(|i〉〈i|q ⊗ |i〉〈i|s)⊗ (|j〉〈j|q′ ⊗ |j〉〈j|s′)
+cijc
∗
ij¯(|i〉〈i|q ⊗ |i〉〈i|s)⊗ (|j〉〈j¯|q′ ⊗ |j〉〈j¯|s′)
+cijc
∗
i¯j(|i〉〈¯i|q ⊗ |i〉〈¯i|s)⊗ (|j〉〈j|q′ ⊗ |j〉〈j|s′)
+cijc
∗
i¯j¯(|i〉〈¯i|q ⊗ |i〉〈¯i|s)⊗ (|j〉〈j¯|q′ ⊗ |j〉〈j¯|s′)](L1L2L′1L′2)†, (16)
where i¯ = i+ 1 (mod 2).
Eavesdropping on the state ρQSL1L2L′1L′2
, Eve transforms it to the following state,
$(ρQSL1L2L′1L′2
) =
∑
i,j,k,l∈{0,1}
Tr(ρQSL1L2L′1L′2
ρ˜q,iρ˜s,jρ˜q′,kρ˜s′,l)ρ˜
′
q,iρ˜
′
s,jρ˜
′
q′,kρ˜
′
s′,l.
where
ρ˜q,i = (1/2)[I + (−1)iX1 · σ], ρ˜s,j = (1/2)[I + (−1)jX2 · σ],
ρ˜′q,i = (1/2)[I + (−1)iX3 · σ], ρ˜′s,j = (1/2)[I + (−1)jX4 · σ],
ρ˜q′,k = (1/2)[I + (−1)kX ′1 · σ], ρ˜s′,l = (1/2)[I + (−1)lX ′2 · σ],
ρ˜′q′,k = (1/2)[I + (−1)kX ′3 · σ], ρ˜′s′,l = (1/2)[I + (−1)lX ′4 · σ],
(17)
and |Xk|2 = |X ′k|2 = 1 (k = 1, · · · , 4). Bob measures it with the projection operator,
ΠQSL1L2L′1L′2
= (L1L2)(|0〉〈0|q ⊗ |0〉〈0|s + |1〉〈1|q ⊗ |1〉〈1|s)(L1L2)†
⊗(L′1L′2)(|0〉〈0|q′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|s′ + |1〉〈1|q′ ⊗ |1〉〈1|s′)(L′1L′2)†.
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The probability that Bob measures the correct signature is given by
PB = (
1
16
)2
∑
L1,L2∈L
∑
L′
1
,L′
2
∈L
Tr[$(ρQSL1L2L′1L′2
)ΠQSL1L2L′1L′2
]
= [
1
2
+
1
8
(X1X3 + Z1Z3)(X2X4 + Z2Z4)][
1
2
+
1
8
(X ′1X
′
3 + Z
′
1Z
′
3)(X
′
2X
′
4 + Z
′
2Z
′
4)]
+
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
{cijc∗ij¯[
1
2
+
1
8
(X1X3 + Z1Z3)(X2X4 + Z2Z4)]
×[−1
8
Y ′1Y
′
2(Z
′
3 −X ′3)(Z ′4 −X ′4)]
+cijc
∗
i¯j[−
1
8
Y1Y2(Z3 −X3)(Z4 −X4)][1
2
+
1
8
(X ′1X
′
3 + Z
′
1Z
′
3)(X
′
2X
′
4 + Z
′
2Z
′
4)]
+cijc
∗
i¯j¯[−
1
8
Y1Y2(Z3 −X3)(Z4 −X4)][−1
8
Y ′1Y
′
2(Z
′
3 −X ′3)(Z ′4 −X ′4)]}.
From
∑
i,j∈{0,1} |cij|2 = 1, we obtain |
∑
i,j∈{0,1} cijc
∗
ij¯ | ≤ 1, |
∑
i,j∈{0,1} cijc
∗
i¯j| ≤ 1, and
|∑i,j∈{0,1} cijc∗i¯j¯ | ≤ 1. Therefore, using the result obtained in Appendix A, we can conclude
PB ≤ (1
2
+
1
8
fMAX)
2 = (
3
4
)2.
(We pay attention to a fact that each term of PB can be gathered with a binomial
coefficient.) When Eve attacks on m pairs out of enciphered qubits generated from an
arbitrary n-qubit entangled state |Ψ〉Q, we obtain PB ≤ (3/4)m.
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